With Language in Mind by de Villiers, Jill
Smith ScholarWorks 
Philosophy: Faculty Publications Philosophy 
2021 
With Language in Mind 
Jill de Villiers 
Smith College, jdevilli@smith.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/phi_facpubs 
 Part of the Philosophy of Language Commons, and the Philosophy of Mind Commons 
Recommended Citation 
de Villiers, Jill, "With Language in Mind" (2021). Philosophy: Faculty Publications, Smith College, 
Northampton, MA. 
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/phi_facpubs/51 
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy: Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of 
Smith ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu 
With language in mind
1.0 Outline of the paper
The relationship between language and theory of mind is a perplexing one that raises questions
about how any concept is connected to language. This paper considers the question of how
mental language and the understanding of propositional attitudes, or intentionality, relate. In the
first section, belief reports are considered, and the conditions on when we invoke them. But
beliefs are not the only mental states that theory of mind encompasses. The next section
addresses which other linguistic phenomena also have point of view, perhaps entailing concepts
that fall short of false belief understanding. The reasonable assumption is that there is conceptual
development that is necessary before its manifestation in language , but in the special case of
reasoning about false beliefs, the usual order seems to be reversed. How can this be?
Recognizing that belief reports entail different points of view on truth assertions, the possible
role that syntactic development seems to play in false belief reasoning is reviewed, with an
assessment of the conflicting evidence. Returning to the language of propositional attitudes like
belief, the learning problem for the different complements of mental verbs is addressed.
Crucially, to achieve the correct truth evaluation requires that the complement be embedded as
an argument under a matrix verb. Children may not immediately or infallibly take that step, and
different opinions are reviewed about the cause and nature of the mistakes made. In a final
section, new puzzles are laid out about other linguistic phenomena such as epistemic modals and
predicates of personal taste where syntax seems to delimit possible meanings.
At issue here is the claim that linguistic phenomena rest on achievements that are
manifest first in non-linguistic domains. Could human language make possible some ideas –
surely not all - that exist, first and foremost, within linguistic phenomena themselves? That is,
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when we consider the “interface” between language and cognitive achievements, we usually
think of cognition providing input to language.  But what if grammar feeds cognition? Or, even
more precisely, what if human grammar is structured human thought? The inspiration for this
theoretical perspective comes from the writings of Wolfram Hinzen (2009, 2014, 2017; Hinzen
& Sheehan, 2014), and empirical puzzles from research have made me receptive to it (de Villiers,
2014; 2017).
2.0 Intentionality
First, consider intentionality itself. Under what kind of conditions do we attribute beliefs
to an individual? In ordinary life, we rarely bother to describe beliefs driving actions. The notion
of a belief state is just too rich and redundant, which is why Behaviorism resisted invoking any
inner states as explanatory devices (Skinner, 1953). Suppose Lizzie is getting ready for work in
the morning. She puts bread in the toaster, gets the tub of butter out of the fridge, and gets a knife
from the drawer. It would be unusual to describe this as driven by a series of beliefs, though they
are implicit in her actions, e.g. that the knives are kept in such-and-such a place, that she will
require butter and a knife to spread it etc. If we interfere with the sequence in some way, we will
see appropriate secondary procedures take over to achieve the goal, for example, if the knives are
all gone from the drawer she will reach into the dishwasher for one. If there are none in the
dishwasher either, we might see a change come over Lizzie, as she moves from habit into
conscious reasoning about where the knives could possibly have gone. Even more strikingly,
what if the toast pops and we see Lizzie insert the knife into an open jar of hand cream and
spread the substance on the toast? Now we are entering the territory of the “false belief”. We
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would explain her action by saying, “Lizzie thought that was the butter!” Notice that Lizzie
probably had no more conscious thought about the matter than if it had proceeded normally, but
we as witnesses leap into interpretive mode: that is precisely when we invoke talk about beliefs
driving actions.
It was with films of such disparate actions that our own investigations twenty years ago
explored when and how children understand and attribute beliefs to others. Three year olds
laughed at the mistakes, but could not offer sensible descriptions of why people did what they
did. They gave explanations such as, “She likes that”. In contrast, four and five year olds often
laughed in anticipation of the mistakes that were to be made, and offered explanations that
referred quite often to belief states, such as “She thought it was the butter!” (de Villiers & de
Villiers, 2000). Language-delayed deaf children shown the same silent videos divided along the
same lines, as a function of their language skill, often two or three years later than hearing
counterparts (Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers & Hoffmeister, 2007).
Complement structures such as:
1. She thought it was the butter.
have properties that set them apart from other kinds of sentences, semantically and syntactically,
making them perfectly suited to capture truths in other possible worlds: worlds in the heads of
other persons. The truth of the embedded proposition “it was the butter”, is relative to the subject
of the sentence, and false to the speaker. Using indices to mark whose world the truth belongs to,
each clause, each proposition, might have an index (PoV for Point of View) reflecting that world
(de Villiers, 2001; 2005):
2. PoV1[she thought PoV2[it was the butter]]
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The matter is not so simple however, because noun phrases also have a point of view on them: in
the above proposition, “the butter” is subsumed under Lizzie’s point of view, and that is not the
label the observer would place on it (hand cream). In more nuanced circumstances, the label is
not a false one, but is nevertheless not one known both by the subject and the speaker. Imagine
that the bread being used in the scenario above, unbeknownst to Lizzie, is one that Lizzie’s
roommate Esmé has been using to grow mold for her biochemistry project. Esmé might
truthfully say to her professor,
3. My roommate ate the bread.
or more informatively,
4. My roommate ate my biochemistry project.
But she could not report,
5. My roommate thought she ate my biochemistry project.
Substitution of co-referential terms is everywhere else a possibility, but it is blocked under
opaque contexts, which is what the sentential complements under verbs constitute. In opaque
contexts, close attention must be paid to the particular knowledge of the subject of the sentence if
one is to preserve truth in labeling. This too, children must learn, and they are rather too
accepting of sentences like (5) until relatively late in acquisition (Russell, 1987; Apperly &
Robinson, 1998; Kamawar & Olson, 1999). The problem is a deep one, and existing treatments
in developmental psychology often scratch the surface of the phenomena of referential opacity
(Apperly & Robinson, 2003; Racoczy, 2015). In a new paper, Gut, Haman, Gorbaniuk and
Chylinskia (2020) make progress in distinguishing the demands of opacity from the demands of
false belief tasks, arguing that perspective taking requires the additional competence of
distinguishing the intensions under which the object is known, not just knowing if the person
registered the object or not (see also de Villiers, 2001;2005). The child has to think in a subtler
way, considering the “intension under which a given belief is presented”, not only its truth value.
However, there is more to be said even still, as children do better in production of the correct
designations than they do in comprehension (Merchant & de Villiers, 2007). The linguistic side
of referential opacity is still neglected.
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3.0 Point of View elsewhere
Surely many aspects of human language also have a point of view. Clauses and noun phrases do
not exhaust the contribution of speaker perspectives. Much literature in linguistics has discussed
point of view as part of the meaning of a wide variety of expressions. De Villiers (2018)
considers such forms as personal (I/you) and spatial (here/there) deixis, of time perspectives in
tense (had been) and adverbs (tomorrow), of personal taste in adjectives (tasty) and adverbs
(fortunately), even prepositions (in front, behind). In addition, in as many as a quarter of the
world’s languages, evidential morphemes must be used as grammatical markers of how a speaker
knows what they are talking about: is it via private experience, via the senses, or it is by hearsay,
or inference? These markers are as obligatory as tense is for an English speaker (Aikhenwald,
2004). Even the use of determiners in English, the choice between a cat versus the cat, requires,
among other factors, consideration of whether the entity in question is new to the listener or not
(Schaffer & de Villiers, 2000; Van Hout, Harrigan & de Villiers, 2010). Point of view is
ubiquitous in linguistic expressions, so does that mean that all such uses require theory of mind
understanding? How else could a child adjust their speech to another’s perspective?
Understanding another’s false beliefs is not the sum of theory of mind development,
though it is a significant one. In the earliest days of inventive experimentation, the first tasks
were being developed to test whether young children could understand that other people had
minds. The psychologists (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983 ) based their reasoning on that of
Premack & Woodruff (1978) , investigating apes, and Dennett (1978), arguing in philosophy, that
the only secure way to know was to see if someone could reason about another person’s false
beliefs. We normally reason premised on our own beliefs being true, but the real test of
5
With language in mind
awareness of other minds is if we can reason from a premise that we know to be false. Truth is at
the heart of this.  Of course, there are earlier tasks at which children can succeed, the difference
being these earlier tasks, and the abilities they reflect, do not entail truth contrasts. A rough
timetable of the achievements on which most researchers agree is provided in Table 1 (more
details can be found in e.g. Wellman & Liu, 2001; de Villiers, 2007). What remains in dispute is
whether the classic tasks developed for testing false belief reasoning, held to be a crowning
achievement of theory of mind, in fact distort what children know from a much earlier age.
Table  1 here
The linguistic markings that seem to entail another’s point of view generally appear
earlier in child language, on the whole, than the corresponding conceptual understanding, like
spatial perspective taking, or understanding that seeing leads to knowing. This could be given
any of at least three interpretations:
a) A popular view is that assessing theory of mind, especially false belief reasoning, via the usual
explicit cognitive tasks is confounded by other skills, such as inhibitory control, that mask what a
child really knows about others’ perspectives. The linguistic phenomena expose the classic tasks
as faulty indices of what children understand about point of view (e.g. Baillargeon, Scott & He,
2010; Wang & Leslie, 2016). If infants have sophisticated core knowledge about theory of mind,
including beliefs, then there is no contradiction, and concepts precede the language, maintaining
the traditional view.
b) Alternatively, one could take the position that the kind of perspective-taking required to use
deixis or evidential marking correctly is less than it seems. In that case, the linguistic forms do
6
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not require sophisticated reasoning and it is not a problem that full theory of mind development
is later in childhood.
c) It is possible that the child succeeds at using the linguistic forms via some knowledge inherent
to the linguistic system that is not broadcast to the larger interface of cognition and language, that
is, the skills might be considered modularized, in some sense, to the language faculty (e.g.
Recanati, 2002).  This view contains two radically different sub-positions. One is that the
grammar has evolved to encode certain properties essential for human thinking (Hinzen, 2014).
The second is that language is the first domain in childhood in which these inherent (or very1
early developed) conceptual skills are demanded, so they show up there first.
3.1 Deixis
It is not clear how to arbitrate empirically among these alternatives given the current state
of our knowledge. Let us take examples of each in turn by way of illustration. Consider personal
pronouns first. Personal pronouns in the first person refer to the speaker, and the second person
to the listener, and hence switch reference. Very young children make the mistake of thinking the
forms are names, as do children with autism for a longer time, and hence can reverse them
(Loveland, 1984; Fay, 1979; Dale & Crain-Thoreson, 1993; Girouard, Ricard  &  Decarie, 1997).
Given that they are very difficult for a caregiver to correct, this can be a challenge. One child
persisted in calling his own soup, “your soup”, to which his caregiver would respond, uselessly,
“that’s not my soup, it’s your soup!” After a few weeks of this, the child seemed driven to invent
1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative.
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a neutral pronoun, “own”, in which each person had “own” soup! But usually by shortly after age
two, the personal pronouns are remarkably error-free, as long as they are in simple sentences.
However, once they are embedded in complex forms, children can have considerable difficulty
keeping track of them (de Villiers, Nordmeyer & Roeper, 2018; Tanz, 1980). Other pronouns can
shift too, if more than two people are in conversation, for example in following directions like:
6. Ask him what color my eyes are   “what color are her eyes?”
The spatial deixis forms, like here/there, this/that, also can switch meaning according to
the speaker, but not necessarily. In some circumstances, we share a perspective: here is here and
there is there for both of us. The usage depends on the domain of contrast, and how big an area is
concerned, and how close we are within it (Fillmore, 1975). In some languages there are more
than two distinctions, as in Latin hic / iste / ille (near speaker / near hearer / away from both). As
with the somewhat archaic English (yonder), the choice of expression requires attention not just
to one's own perspective but whether the listener shares it. "Yonder" means away from both of
us, even if we are apart. Children’s use of spatial deixis is harder to gauge, given that it is
contextually variable. In the case where a barrier makes the division of space more precise,
preschoolers are able to work out the meaning of expressions such as, “it's over there”, or “it’s in
this cup”, though they are not perfect (de Villiers & de Villiers, 1974; Clark & Sengul, 1978).
Thus, there is a puzzle. The simple switching of perspective required by personal
pronouns and spatial deixis is acquired in a period before children can do explicit theory of mind
tasks, even those involving say, seeing and knowing, i.e. earlier than false beliefs (Wellman &
Liu, 2004). How do we interpret this? Taking position a) one could assert that nonverbal
experimental tasks are often flawed, and that only tasks that consider eye-gaze reveal the true
8
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state of children’s knowledge.  In other words, one could grant perspectival knowledge to the
children at this age, and argue that whatever they have in the way of implicit theory of mind is
recruited to help language contrasts. There is work suggesting that infants younger than two
years can recognize false beliefs in another person, because they react accordingly by looking
longer (Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010), or looking in anticipation (Southgate & Vernetti, 2014).
Why then is the passing of classic false belief tasks so late, at 4 to 5 years? Some theorists
believe that infants understand others’ beliefs, but to activate a decision, they need to add
executive function skills. That is, they have implicit false beliefs, but not explicit false beliefs:
something else is needed to use that incipient understanding in reasoning. But if implicit false
belief is not supposed to drive decisions, is linguistic usage not a decision? The implicit theory of
mind has also been described as unconscious, perhaps in the sense that it is not broadcast to other
parts of the mind (Baars, 2002). But language is a different faculty of the mind.
Taking position b) in contrast, one could claim that children are succeeding in the single
usage by some simpler means, and are therefore fooling us that they have mastered perspective.
Could they have learned some kind of “switching” rule, for example, to get the pronouns right?
Perhaps this is how they are handling some spatial deictics, i.e. using them right only in a case
where the boundaries are clear.
Position c) asks, what if the language faculty itself has built into it a capacity to encode
point of view, just as grammar represents the timeline of events, or the event structure of actions?
Controversially, Chomsky (2007), as well as Hinzen (2006) argued that the source of semantics,
apart from lexical semantics, is grammar. In such a case there is no “interface” with general
cognition in which concept arise first: instead, the grammar constitutes the contrasts. When the
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sentences become more complex, as with pronouns inside complements, or when the spatial
deixis is made contextually richer, children stumble. But why propose that is a cognitive failure,
reflected in the language? There is nothing in non-verbal cognition that comes close to matching
the complexity that is achieved in such a conversation. Suppose instead one argues that
mastering the linguistic forms in all their subtlety is all there is. Then grammar itself makes
possible and represents the highly elaborate edifice of points of view and their connections.
The alternative mentioned is that language is the first modality in which real demands are
made on these concepts, and that is why language leads. This is an attractive idea, but it is
difficult to reconcile with the long delay in reasoning found in language delayed children (see
Section 4.0). When the normal timetable of language is blocked, why do these children not
manifest the core ability in nonverbal tasks?
3.2 Evidentiality
Take the tricky case of evidentiality as a second illustration. Evidentials create a serious
puzzle for the standard view of Theory of Mind. The evidential markers –usually verb inflections
or as in Tibetan, varieties of the copula - reflect a person’s own perspective on how they know
something. In Tibetan, for example, there are markers for ego-knowledge (e.g. a taste), for a
witnessed event (e.g. what the speaker saw), for inference (from a clue, rather than the event
itself), and from more general inference (e.g. from a calendar, or a schedule) (Kalsang, Speas,
Garfield & de Villiers, 2013). In other languages, a hearsay evidential morpheme is prominent
(e.g. Korean, see Papafragou, Li, Choi & Han, 2007). However, the range of possibilities in the
world’s languages does not extend much beyond this handful of alternatives (Speas, 2004),
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suggesting that language sets constraints on the kinds of meanings that can appear. In using each
one, a speaker selects the appropriate morpheme that indicates how they came to know the truth
of the proposition. These are not hedges on truth, though a listener could weigh the likelihood of
the veracity of each mode of knowing (de Villiers, Garfield, Gernet-Girard, Roeper & Speas,
2009). Evidentials seem on first glance not to involve perspective taking at all, since the
morphemes are self-referent. Yet how could a child possibly learn to use them, without first
being able to interpret what another speaker means when they use one?
Several researchers have claimed that children adopt the use of evidential morphemes
early and errorlessly (Choi, 1991). This raises questions about whether some sophisticated
conceptual perspective taking is allowing these meanings. Again, the choices seem threefold:
First, perhaps children could utilize their implicit theory of mind skills to establish the meaning
of the evidentials, thus maintaining the traditional view that nonverbal concepts underlie
linguistic use. Second, perhaps children are succeeding by some lesser method, for example, in
spontaneous situations, which are not controlled, a young child could sound persuasively adult
by restricting use to the simpler morphemes and by mimicking what others say. Use of the more
complex morphemes such as inferentials in Tibetan is quite late in development (de Villiers &
Garfield, 2017), and errors of commission are made there. Thirdly, and more radically, perhaps
the language faculty allows the encoding of distinctions that lie well beyond what a child can
achieve non-linguistically at that same age. As the language develops further, to contrast e.g.
epistemics versus evidentials, or complement-taking verbs versus evidentials  (de Villiers &
Garfield, 2009; 2017), the internal grammar elaborates appropriately for a given language type.
We should keep open the possibility that instead of concepts developing first and feeding the
11
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grammar, the grammatical distinctions, internal to the language faculty, might feed conceptual
distinctions that are outside of language.
One might then expect an odd and variable relationship between language and
non-language conceptual tasks, which is exactly what is observed in empirical work on
evidentiality, where paradoxically, production is often seen ahead of comprehension (Kyuchukov
& de Villiers, 2009; de Villiers et al, 2009; Aksu-Koç, Avci, Aydin, Sefer & Yasa, 2005;
Papafragou, et al 2007, Aksu-Koç, Ögel-Balaban, & Alp, 2009; Uzundağ, Taşcı, Küntay,
Aksu-Koç, 2018; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2016; Ünal & Papafragou, 2016, Ünal & Papafragou,
2018). The contrasts in evidential morphemes in comprehension develop later, and perhaps do
depend on the development of both a more sophisticated theory of mind and inference skills,
especially in judging how to ask the right question contingent on what the interlocutor knows (de
Villiers & Garfield, 2017).
It is clear that there is much more still to be investigated about the relationship between
various linguistic phenomena that take point of view - short of complementation – and their
possible nonverbal equivalents. For example, there is virtually no comprehensive research on the
impact of language delay that might allow us to ask if there are concomitant delays in nonverbal
perspective taking in those areas of theory of mind that are earlier on the scale than false belief
reasoning, and that do not entail truth contrasts.
4.0 Language for the Propositional Attitudes
De Villiers (2005; 2010) has argued that in the case of reasoning about the propositional attitudes,
namely false belief, we have to perform computations across representations that are at least as complex
12
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as those of natural language. The point has been made theoretically also by Segal (1998) and Collins
(2000).  The prediction is that children’s mastery of complement forms as in 1. (repeated here)
1. She thought it was the butter.
should be one of the best predictors of their ability to pass classic theory of mind tasks, in which they
must deliberate about another’s false belief understanding. What is the status of the evidence?
The so-called “memory for complements” task has been widely adopted as the index of
complement mastery following the results of de Villiers & Pyers (2002).  A sample scenario goes as
follows (see Figure 1):
7. The woman said the girl had a bug in her hair, but it was just a leaf.
What did the woman say the girl had in her hair?
Correct answer: Bug.
“Reality answer”: Leaf.
In the longitudinal study across a year of preschool by de Villiers & Pyers, young typically-developing
children were tested three times on a batch of explicit false belief tasks (such as Unseen displacement
and expected contents) and a set of 12 wh-questions like 7), half of them using communication verbs.
The natural expectation was these questions would depend on cognitive success first. However the
reverse was found: children passed the wh-question task in advance of passing the false belief tasks.
There have been numerous subsequent studies, with some confirmations of the same result (Lowe, 2010;
San Juan & Astington, 2012; Perner, Sprung, Zauner & Haider, 2003; Brandt, Buttleman, Lieven &
Tomasello, 2016). Others have found different complex linguistic forms are predictive as well (Smith,
Apperly &White, 2003; Durrleman, Hinzen, & Franck, 2018), and yet others found that complements
have no special advantage over general syntactic competence (Cheung, Husan-Chih, Creed, Ng, Wang,
13
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& Mo 2004; Slade & Ruffman, 2005), or even over executive function, specifically inhibitory control
(Hughes & Ensor, 2007). With relatively small samples, and many converging skills at the same age
with little variance in age of acquisition (Wellman & Liu, 2001), some noise is to be expected
empirically. Three sets of results suggest that the theory can be supported despite variability in the
findings.
The first set comes from cases in which the acquisition path of language is spread out over time
because of delays or insufficiencies of input. Much research has now been conducted with children with
various developmental delays in language to see how their theory of mind skills are impacted. An early
study suggested that there was no delay in false belief reasoning in children with specific language
impairment (Van der Lely, Hennessey & Battell, 2001), a result interpreted as meaning that the
conceptual understanding was not affected by language delay. Several papers (de Villiers, Burns, &
Pearson, B., 2003; Andrés-Roqueta, Adrian, Clemente, & Katsos, 2013; Farrar, Johnson, Tompkins,
Easters, Zilisi-Medus, & Benigno, 2009; Durrleman, Burnel, Thommen, Foudon, Sonié, Reboul, &
Fourneret, 2016) and two recent meta-analyses (Nilsson & López, 2016;  Farrar, Benigno, Tompkins, &
Gage, 2017) show the opposite to be true. There is a pervasive delay in ToM reasoning contingent on
the language delay of the children, even when low-verbal tasks are used. In fact, the meta-analysis of
Farrar et al (2017) strongly suggests that the development of complementation plays a major role for
children whose language is delayed. Their interpretation is that children with various language
disabilities might need language as a bootstrap in a way that children with typical language do not. It is
also possible that the greater variance in abilities and timing makes the result clearer in the atypical
population.
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Reflecting a similar phenomenon, children with profound hearing impairment who are
developing language more slowly, either because their parents have adopted an oral approach, or
because they are only later exposed to Sign language, can be seriously delayed in False belief
reasoning (Peterson & Siegal, 2005; Schick et al 2007). Furthermore, their performance on even
the tasks adapted to be less verbal is predictable from their command of complement syntax and
vocabulary (Schick et al, 2007). Deaf children born to Deaf parents and using Sign from birth,
are unaffected in their development of false belief reasoning. It could be argued that language is
only a tool that assists in theory of mind reasoning, and that with enough life experience, perhaps
behavioral observations alone will help such children arrive at a working theory of other minds.
In many areas, learning via human language has been hailed as a shortcut for the slower learning
that occurs through direct experience. But the adults who learned a simpler version of
Nicaraguan Sign Language did not benefit from their years of social engagement and
observation, as they continued to fail false belief tasks into their twenties (Pyers & Senghas,
2009). Only when they developed linguistic devices to encode mental state descriptions did they
begin reasoning like other adults. This finding casts doubt on the interpretation that language is
merely the domain which the conceptual demands normally arise first.
Finally, children with autism (Tager-Flusberg & Joseph; 2005; Durrleman et al, 2016)
reveal the same pattern, namely, children with associated language impairment can’t pass the
standard tasks until they have language of a sufficient complexity.  Complementation is shown to
be a major predictor of their success on false belief tests.
A second set of results comes from deeper mining of data on typically developing children. A
large-scale study of children growing up in poverty, studied as part of a curriculum intervention study in
15
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preschools and daycare center in Florida and Texas ( de Villiers et al, 2013; in preparation). The large N2
(325), longitudinal design and extensive testing battery allowed the researchers to explore the relations
and predictors using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), which can look at the coherence of
constructs, and offers a greater chance of unpacking directionality and mediating effects. The children
were assessed towards the beginning of their final preschool year (Time 1, average age 4.51 years, range
3.03 to 5.52 years) and again towards the end of the school year (Time 3, average age 5.04 years, range
3.58 to 6.07 years). In the middle of the year (Time 2), non-verbal IQ and verbal memory span (word
span) were assessed.  Table 2 shows the measures taken.
Table 2 here
Preliminary results reveal one of the fundamental difficulties in running purely correlational
studies with typically developing children, as all variables of interest with the exception of nonverbal IQ
are correlated with the composite false belief score at the last time point. However, a hierarchical
regression looking at the longitudinal data reveals that both language measures and inhibitory control at
Time 1 have significant predictive effects on false belief reasoning at Time 2. An initial Structural
Equation Model on the longitudinal data confirms a significant contribution of complementation to the
change in Theory of Mind scores, over and above the variance explained by general vocabulary and
executive function (de Villiers, de Villiers, Lindley, Chen et al. (2013). Therefore, different aspects of
language have separate effects on explicit FB understanding in development, both concurrently and
longitudinally. Inhibitory Control also has separate direct concurrent and longitudinal effects on FB
reasoning. The SEM supports theories of general language effects (Astington & Jenkins, 1999) as well
2 All were part of the School Readiness Research Consortium curriculum intervention project, funded by NICHD (P01
HD048497)
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as specific effects of complement syntax on the development of explicit FB reasoning (de Villiers &
Pyers, 2002).
Finally, a third set of developmental findings comes from training studies, in which children
who lack both false belief reasoning and complementation are trained specifically on complements. The
training has usually employed verbs of communication like say or tell that also can take false
propositions in their complements. In this way, any subsequent improvement on false belief cannot be
attributed to teaching about mental states themselves . Children trained to understand false complements3
should improve on false belief reasoning tasks by virtue of acquiring the appropriate representational
structures. This was found in English by Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2003), then also in German (Lohmann
& Tomasello, 2003), and French (Durrleman, et al, 2020). In Mandarin, Shuliang, Yanjie & Sabbagh
(2014), explicitly avoided any mental state content in their communication verb-complement training
and still found pay off in false belief understanding. However, complexities arise because success is
sometimes reported after training in false beliefs directly (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann &
Tomasello), using teaching that offers perspective contrasts that were not encoded in complement
structures. Shuliang et al. (2014) report for Mandarin that although the findings showed that facility with
sentential complement grammatical structures could promote false belief reasoning, sometimes false
belief understanding emerged even when children did not show improvement on sentential complement
constructions. That would suggest it is not strictly necessary to have comprehension of sentential
complements.
All things considered, the strong suggestion is that language training can at least facilitate false
3 There is continued controversy over whether using verbs of communication simply presupposes mental states.
However not all false complements under communication verbs entail false beliefs: they can also be used for
deception e.g. “The mother said she bought paper towels” (because she was concealing the birthday cake). In
addition, the children in these studies were chosen for training precisely because they failed to understand false
beliefs and false complements.
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belief reasoning, and the children who stand to benefit most from this are children with clinical issues,
such as children with autism. In a new study, Durrleman et al (2020) studied a group of French children
with autism. These children initially failed both complementation and false belief tasks, then were
trained on complements with verbs of communication in a software program that they interacted with
for only a few hours a week for several weeks. At the end, they showed significant improvement in false
belief reasoning over a control group trained with software on vocabulary for the same duration.
Nevertheless, there are plenty of doubts about the conclusion that the language of complements
is prerequisite for false belief reasoning. The obvious starting point is the numerous studies of infant
theory of mind, in which many researchers believe they have found evidence for sophisticated reasoning
long before children are verbal, never mind syntactically competent (see Baillargeon, Buttleman &
Southgate, 2018: Kulke, Von Duhn, Schneider, & Rakoczy, 2018). The debate rests on a succession of
four points: whether the findings are reliable, and if they are, whether eye gaze is a sufficient index of
understanding (see also Rubio-Fernandez, 2018), and if so, whether infants’ sensitivity is to others’
belief or something lesser (Perner & Ruffman, 2005) and if indeed it is beliefs, whether early
understanding might have some signature limitation (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low & Watts, 2013).
An important new summary (Newen & Wolf, 2020) attempts a reconciliation of the infant and preschool
findings, suggesting a three-stage model couched in terms of mental files (Perner Huemer & Lahey,
2015). However, the role that language might play in the change is not yet accommodated.
As described, developmental studies that pit complementation against other language measures
sometimes find that complements are less significant than broader measures of syntax, in typically
developing children. Interestingly, most of the failures to find a unique role for complements over other
language (Farrar et al, 2017) come from studies with Chinese-speaking children (Mandarin and
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Cantonese), in which the syntactic marking is very lean. Furthermore, though the training studies find
that training on complements works, and persist (Durrleman et al, 2020), they leave open the possibility
that there could be other, though perhaps less efficient routes, such as training directly on false belief
tasks without using complex language. It remains to be discovered if these are also lasting or broad
changes.
5.0 Do any concepts in adults require the use of language?
Adult Theory of Mind is usually taken for granted, unless the adult in question has some
atypicality, for example Asperger’s’ syndrome (Senju, Southgate, White and Frith, 2009) or
sociopathy (see Paal & Bereczkei, (2007). But in fact, it is important to study adults to differentiate
theories about Theory of Mind. For example, a strong and sensible rival to the idea that children
use language to represent false beliefs is that children learn from language about theory of mind.
There is an abundance of good data showing that families that engage in more discourse about
mental states have children who grasp false beliefs earlier (Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Meins,
Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & Rosnay, 2013). Many have argued that discourse is part of the
evidence, perhaps the major evidence, from which children develop the particular cultural theory
about other minds (Berio, 2020). Of course, in that case, adults wouldn't need language to reason
about false beliefs, because the theory has been fully developed.
For example, what would happen to adults if they had their language “tied up” in echoing
speech (shadowing)? Would they fail to understand a false belief scenario? The inspiration for
this question was the work by Hermer-Vasquez, Spelke and Katznelson (1999) on language and
spatial reasoning. They showed that adults shadowing a story, but not those shadowing rhythmic
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patterns, could not find an object hidden in a location that required a description such as “to the
left of the red wall”. (Neither can rats, children below age four, or Nicaraguans deaf adults
without a fully developed Sign (Pyers & Senghas, 2009). The conclusion was that shadowing
language interfered with reasoning ability that rested on language for its success (See also
Carruthers, 2002).  In Newton and de Villiers (2007), the adult participants’ task was to choose
the right ending of a video: for example, in an unseen displacement task, where will the mouse
look for his cheese? The finding in Newton and de Villiers was that adults who were engaged in
verbal shadowing could not predict the ending of a False belief video, though an
attentionally-matched rhythmic shadowing did not affect judgement, and True Belief videos were
easy under both types of shadowing. Newton and de Villiers argued that it was not because of
simple attentional difficulty, as shown by control of rhythmic shadowing matched for its
attentional demands. Neither was it because of a competing narrative, as shown by another
control in which English-speaking adults shadowed Swahili, and showed the same disruption
despite the absence of meaning (Newton, 2005). However simpler forms of shadowing such as
saying “bababa” (Newton, 2005) or repeating digits (Samuel, Durdevic, Legg, Lurz, & Clayton,
2019) does not disrupt reasoning. Nor, tantalizingly, does verbal interference affect it if it is not
simultaneous, but appears only after the video has finished, namely, the participant is not under
dual-task interference while watching the video (Samuel et al, 2019). The language faculty has to
be engaged, simultaneously, by something beyond repetitive speech. Though the study followed
the logic of the study by Hermer-Vasquez, et al (1999) on spatial reasoning, the control of
rhythmic shadowing was called into question in later follow-ups (Dungan & Sachs, 2012).
Suggestions are made that the verbal shadowing disrupts something more like executive function
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skills than conceptual understanding. On that argument, even rhythmic shadowing could be made
difficult enough to disrupt false belief reasoning (see de Villiers, in press, for more discussion).
The dual task studies with adults have variable results, in that one can find a rhythmic tapping
task that interferes as much as language shadowing when carefully titrated for the particular
subjects (Dungan & Saxe, 2012), who nevertheless conclude:
“Consistent with Newton and de Villiers (2007), we found that verbal shadowing led to a
striking impairment in adults’ false-belief performance. Although we found that this
effect was not specific to verbal shadowing, linguistic resources may nevertheless
contribute to false-belief reasoning when working memory is not impaired.” (p.1155)
The field of cognitive science is far from understanding what various kinds of language
shadowing actually disturb (Margulis, 2014; Samuel et al, 2019), or what they might disturb
about broader event understanding (Forgeot-Arc & Ramus, 2011; see also Floyd, 2014, on event
telicity). Finally, the shadowing results are at odds with case studies of adult aphasic patients
who can succeed on false belief tasks in the apparent absence of syntactic competence (Varley,
Siegal & Want, 2001; Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussain, & Humphreys, 2006), though these
have been questioned too (Baldo, Dronkers, Wilkins, Ludy, Raskin & Kim, 2005). It may still be
true that language is needed for the development of false belief, but then becomes an optional
tool to facilitate reasoning in adults. Dungan and Saxe (2012) suggest it might be the default
form of reasoning unless there are impediments.
The debate has spurred a different line of work that has tried instead to identify the
category of events that are disrupted by verbal shadowing (Jung & Hummel, 2013) . Using an
eye tracker and anticipatory eye-gaze minimizes task demands and makes it possible to test
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infants as well using the same procedures. Adults engaged in shadowing linguistic material have
difficulty seeing the resemblance across event types or stimulus types that are tied together
propositionally. For instance, events having the common property of negation (Nordmeyer, 2011)
or telicity (Floyd, 2015), or stimuli that require a propositional description (like Hermer-Vasquez
et al. (1999) on “to the left of the blue wall”, Margulis (2014) on “downward descending from
the left” (from Gentner & Kurtz, 2005). Concepts untouched by shadowing are complex visual
stimuli that seem not to require a propositional description (e.g. prototypes of faces: Margulis,
2015) and artifacts versus natural kinds (Nordmeyer, 2011). At the very limit of this distinction is
the case of simple reversible transitive sentences e.g. adult kiss child/child kiss adult (de Villiers,
2014); dog push car versus car push dog (Shukla & de Villiers, submitted), where it appears that
adults engaged in complex verbal shadowing fail to construct a representation that distinguishes
them, as do young toddlers shown the same stimuli. Yet shadowing adults and toddlers can see
the resemblance across simpler intransitive events such as dog rolling versus dog jumping,
despite close matches in scene complexity (Shukla & de Villiers, submitted).
These kinds of findings suggest that the specialized language faculty of the human mind
is requisite for seeing the similarity across event or stimulus types that lie beyond the very basic
sortals that we share with other creatures. On this radical view, ongoing access to our faculty of
grammar is needed for semantic distinctions.
6.0 Why are complements unique in syntax?
The paper began with a radical proposal, that some concepts are a product of the language
faculty itself. Complements have the property that they describe a world in the speaker’s or thinker’s
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mind. This is what gives them the right property for being the representational medium for false belief
reasoning. But complements don’t all describe something false, therefore the proposal needs refinement.
De Villiers (2005) made the proposal that the complements in question had to be realis, rather than
irrealis, namely the proposition had to be truth-evaluable with respect to the speaker’s or the shared
world. Notice the contrast in complement type:
8.     What did Dad think Sally bought?
9.    What did Dad want to buy?
The infinitival complement in 9) is irrealis, lacking a separate truth in the absence of tense: there is
nothing that can be evaluated about the truth of “to buy”, or even “pro to buy”. The nature of the attitude
verb and its complement is the focus of several research studies. It has long been established that
children understand, and use, complements with want before complements with think. Perner, Sprung,
Zauner & Haider, (2003) found that German-speaking children answered wh-questions with want
complements correctly before wh questions with think complements, in a contrast like this:
10. Mutter will dass Andreas ins Bett geht.
Mother wants that Andy in bed goes.
11. Mutter glaupt dass Andreas ins Bett geht.
Mother thinks that Andreas in bed goes.
As a result of the identity of the complements in German, Perner et al argued that the difference
in children’s performance had to be conceptual: desires are understood before beliefs.
In an attempt at a rebuttal, de Villiers (2005) showed two things: first, that it was the complement
that mattered, not the verb. Invoking the distinction between realis and irrealis clauses, de Villiers (2005)
reported a study in which the children do better with the irrealis modal form under think:
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12. Does Mom think that Bella should wash the dog?
than the realis tensed form:
13. Does Mom think Bella washed the dog?
In the same study, children were tested on two forms of want with complements:
14. Does Mom want Bella to play on the piano?
15. Does Mom want Bella playing on the piano?
Children treated 14) and 15) exactly the same: as irrealis, and correctly answered them. Notice that this
result reveals that the verb alone is not the significant contributor in English: it is the clause with the
verb that counts. A similar point was made by contrasting two forms of the verb say in another study (de
Villiers, Harrington, Gadilauskas & Roeper, 2012), namely:
16. What did Dad say he bought?
17. What did Dad say to buy?
Children were much more likely to answer the infinitive case in 17) correctly. The result is massively
confirmed in the data from 674 children tested using QUILS, an early screener that included
complements of both types under say (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 here
But across languages, infinitives are not always the grammatical marker used in contrast with
tensed clauses. In both French and Spanish, irrealis clauses are manifest as subjunctives instead of
infinitives. For example, take the following pair of contrasts:
18. Dónde le dijo Sofîa a Mauricio que estaba Javier?
Where  said Sofia to Mauricio that was Javier?
‘Where did Sofia tell Mauricio that Javier went?’
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19. A dónde le dijo la abuelita a Javier que fuera?
To where said the Grandma to Javier that he <would go>?
‘Where did the Grandma tell Javier to go?’
In the first, the form is indicative, much as in an English tensed clause. But the equivalent to the
English infinitive is the change to subjunctive in Spanish. Linguists have argued that
these subjunctive clauses are -TNS (they are restricted by the tense of the matrix clause that contains
them), though they have subject agreement (Iglesias & de Villiers, 2019). In the second case Javier is not
a subject, but a dative argument in the matrix clause that has obligatory control over embedded subject
pro.  Children learning Spanish treat realis and irrealis complements differently, making more errors
with the realis clauses with indicative mood, and finding the subjunctive easier. Again, it is the tensed
embedded clause that causes difficulties for young children, in  each of their languages. Figure 3 shows
data from a large sample of bilingual Spanish-English children (N=357) on both the English and Spanish
parts of the bilingual QUILS: ES  (Iglesias, de Villiers, Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek & Wilson, 2019; Iglesias,
Golinkoff, de Villiers, Hirsh-Pasek & Wilson, in press).
Figure 3 here
This brings us back to German. Perner et al (2003) had argued that the clauses under think and
want were exactly the same in German, so how could children make a syntactic distinction for which
complement was realis? De Villiers (2005) claimed that the two structures still differed underlyingly in
German, not on the surface with a single pair, but when one considers the range of other forms into
which they can morph, namely what other syntactic or morphological properties they allow. A single
instance will not fix the difference, but the array of data available in the input will teach the child that
they are only superficially the same.
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In a more recent paper Hacquard and Lidz (2018) make progress on the difference in types of
complements under attitude verbs and they invoke a set of ingredients – semantic, pragmatic and
syntactic- to help children achieve the distinction. They also mention the variation in other languages
like French and Spanish, where the difference in the complements of desire and belief is carried by
mood: subjunctive to represent the intensional/irrealis case, and indicative for the realis case. Hacquard
and Lidz then demonstrate that in English as well as these Romance languages, the embedded
complement under a belief verb takes the same syntax as the matrix clause. They confirm that the same
argument can be made for German: the embedded clause under a cognitive verb can take on
characteristics of the matrix clause in terms of verb placement and complementizer use (Brandt, Lieven
& Tomasello (2010). In German the usual placement of a verb in an embedded structure is at the end,
20. Maria {denkt/will}, dass Peter heute kommt.
Maria {thinks/wants} that Peter today comes.
In matrix clauses the verb is moved to C (so-called “second position”). However, in realis clauses under
think (denkt), but not irrealis, the verb can also be in C (“second position”), and that is the most frequent
in child-directed speech:
21. Maria {denkt/*will}, Peter kommt heute.
Maria {thinks/wants} Peter comes today.
‘Mary thinks that Peter is coming today’.
Hacquard and Lidz’s cross-linguistic solution for classifying complements is termed the
Declarative Main Clause Syntax Hypothesis:
“..learners exploit speech act similarities between belief verbs and declarative main
clauses to make the right semantic inferences. If so, he/she might infer that the verb think
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has a meaning that is compatible within direct assertions, i.e. think expresses a judgment
of truth (belief).”  (Huang et al, 2018)…..This proposal resolves the cross-linguistic
challenge to syntactic bootstrapping: the learner only needs to track syntactic hallmarks
of declarative clauses, whatever these turn out to be in a specific language (such as
finiteness in English)”. Hacquard and Lidz (2018, p5)
By this means, then, children can use the language around them to differentiate the two types of
verbs. Using correlated syntactic patterns is only part of what Hacquard and Lidz (2018)
propose, as they also invoke the notion that young children can pragmatically identify the speech
acts being engaged in by those around them to differentiate desire from belief. Following Lewis,
Hacquard & Lidz (2013;2017), the mistakes children make are seen as pragmatic ones, occurring
in cases where the experimental scenario does not present a compelling occasion to use their
existing concept of belief.
“… we will argue that children's difficulty with think is not due to its syntax or semantics
, but to the kinds of pragmatic enrichments that verbs that express truth judgments trigger.
We will present evidence that when we control for pragmatic enrichments, 3-year olds
display an adult-like understanding of think sentences, even in false belief contexts”
(Lewis, Hacquard & Lidz, 2017)
This is indeed the heart of the matter. The issue is not just differentiating between ordinary verbs,
desire and belief verbs, and working out which syntax is associated with each type.  The real
question is, how do children come to realize that the complements under belief verbs, even
having all the properties of matrix clauses, are fundamentally different in that they refer, not to
the actual world, but to possible worlds? The clause level is not sufficient. Hacquard and Lidz
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take this to involve an integration with both existing conceptual understanding and with the
pragmatics of test scenarios.  But is that necessary?
Consider instead a syntactic proposal, namely, that the clauses following certain verbs,
namely belief verbs, do not just follow but are embedded as arguments. The missing ingredient
is: how does a clause become interpreted as an argument? Hinzen, Sheehan & Reichard (2014)
contend that intensionality is an “architectural consequence” of the human grammar. They make
the point that matrix clauses and embedded intentional complements differ in a critical way: it is
nothing about their internal form, but rather the grammatical fact that one is an argument of the
verb.  With the sentences:
22. Joanne cooked.
23. Alice thought that Joanne cooked
24. Joanne cooked and Alice believes this.
Hinzen et al take it as clear that 33) is not taken to assert that Joanne cooked: the truth value is
indeterminate. The fact that the clause is an argument of the verb in 33) makes all the difference.
The ellipsis in the coordination in 34) does not suffice. They contend that the truth of a sentence
is only applied at its root, because of a more general principle they refer to as the nonrecursivity
of reference (Arsenijevic & Hinzen, 2012): a syntactic phrase of category X recursively
embedded in a phrase of the same type lacks referential force. Hence, referentiality is a
grammatical notion.
How does truth come into the matter at all? Hinzen (2009; Hinzen et al 2014) argues that
truth is a property that emerges internally, from the syntax of natural language.  In particular, he
argues that anything less than a clause cannot have a truth, that is cannot be evaluated as true or
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false: Noun phrases, Small Clauses, Infinitive Complements, all lack the necessary structure.
Truth comes about by way of tense in a clause, but it alone is insufficient: a full CP phrase with
Force is what is needed.
“An object described through a particular nominal predicate will be located in space (NP); an
event described through a particular verbal predicate is located in time (vP); and a proposition
described through a tensed proposition is located in discourse (CP)” (Hinzen, 2009).
The fully constructed clause is thus the skeleton on which truth depends. There must be a full Thematic
structure, and all of the arguments of the event-head have been appropriately filled.  Take the case of
PUSH (Agent, Patient). If this becomes a noun (the dog’s pushing of the car), then it will never be
evaluated for truth.  But with a tensed verb: “The dog pushed the car”, and merged with C, the structure
becomes something that can be asserted in discourse and evaluated for truth value. The preconditions for
this evaluation lie in the grammar.
7.0 More syntax makes questions easier to interpret
If the acquisition of embedded complement structures facilitates false belief understanding, does
that continue to higher levels of complexity? For example, does mastery of second order complements
predict second order false beliefs? The results of several attempts so far have been mixed ( ).
However, using recursive complements seems to avoid the possibility that concerned Lewis et al
(2013), namely that children might give reality answers because they interpret 1) as a parenthetical like
25) in which the lower clause is the main clause, and therefore true:
25. Mary, the man said, is in Boston.
In recursive sentences, parenthetical interpretations are not so easily obtained: 26 should be ruled out:
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26. *Mary, the man said his wife thought, is in Boston.
de Villiers, Roeper and Kotfila (2019) asked children questions using three clauses, with recursive
complements, as in 27.:
27. When did Mom think that Dad said the boy got his train?
Note that the resolution of the question involves integrating two different points of view, Mom’s and
Dad’s, to arrive at the answer. Furthermore, a three clause structure is definitively recursive, whereas a
two clause structure could be idiomatic. In the literature on recursion across structures in different
languages, Hollebrandse and Roeper (2014) argue that some seemingly forms can appear as idioms, but
the process is not productive. The double recursion in 35) involves real cyclic movement of the wh, with
no ambiguity of structure, attaching the lower clause trace to the top wh.
Surprisingly, de Villiers et al found that recursive cases like this make four year olds resist the
reality answers that they give to the single embedding. In their study 28 children aged 3;5 to 5;7 and 16
monolingual English adults were tested on 6 stories followed by a three clause wh question like 35). The
wh-questions were adjunct questions that could originate in any of the clauses: The stories were
designed to contain six potential, salient answers, of course not all grammatically warranted. These
potential answers were varied as much as possible in their position or recency in the story relative to the
final question, and post-hoc analyses suggest the position in the story is not a factor in the answer given.
The answer about when Mom spoke, and the fully integrated answer from the top CP, were the
only legitimate answers for most adults for sentences like (35). Unexpectedly, answering the wh with
respect to the integrated last clause with full scope is the preferred answer at every age, as for adults.
The “reality” answer in which only the last verb is linked to the question but not integrated with the
others was of most interest. There was a massive reduction in “reality” answers (<20%) by children
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compared to their answers on the two clause case, in which they are very common (>40%) (F(1,77)= 28,
p<.001). Cyclic systematic operations like wh-movement appeared to trigger the correct grammatical
analysis of recursive complements, and reduced reality answers.
Single embeddings under belief verbs remain ambiguous for children for longer. We argue that
cyclic movement across recursive structures is a purely syntactic operation that ignores lexical and
idiosyncratic information. The syntactic operation of cyclic movement, necessary for more than two
clauses, seems to circumscribe the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of wh-questions. Typically
developing children show early awareness of this constraint.
What we do not yet know is whether this aptitude more exactly captures what children
know when they can do false belief reasoning. Perhaps single complements do not always reflect
the knowledge of point of view that recursive grammar fixes. There are two ways that the
understanding of the complement under mental verb can be enhanced. One is contextual:
emphasize the contrasting epistemic stance of two characters. That manipulation alone will not
get you all the way to the right semantics of think if you don't know it already. The second is
syntactic: prove that the structure is syntactically recursive, with embedded arguments. When it
is clear that the complement is an argument of the verb, the right truth value can be assessed with
respect to the root only. This discovery cannot be immediate, because syntactic development
must proceed in respect to the properties of each language. There is much empirical work to be
done to move the debate forward, but the question is exciting.
8.0 Beyond simple attitudes
Before concluding, consider some further cases ripe for more experimentation. Modals are also
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irrealis: at least one cannot judge the truth of “Bella should wash the dog” using the same procedures as
we judge “Bella washed the dog”. In a deontic modal complement, Tense is irrelevant to whether or not
the action has been or is being completed at the time of utterance:
28. Bella should wash the dog.
is only deniable based on Bella’s obligation to wash the dog, not whether or not she is washing the dog/
has washed the dog at the time of the utterance. Surprisingly, this makes correct long distance answers
easier for the child (de Villiers, 2005). Again, Tense seems to be tied up in this determination of truth
value.
Are all modals irrealis? Modals come in two flavors for lexical items such as must.  The
epistemic modals involve knowledge or inference, as in
29. When did Mom say Bill must be sleeping? (epistemic)
but the deontic modals involve obligation:
30. When did Mom say Bill must sleep? (deontic, root)
It has been argued (e.g. Hacquard, 2007; Cournane, 2015), that epistemic modals involve more
embedding than the deontic kind, of at least a tense node:
31. a. Bella must be washing the dog.
b. Bella must have washed the dog.
Handily, in German they appear in different structural positions in the tree, one above Tense and one
below. 2 a. and b. are deniable based on the evidence that Bella is washing/has washed the dog at the
time of the utterance. Tense is thus relevant to the truth. Theoretically, then, complements with epistemic
modals might pattern with tensed complements in children’s judgements. But the evidence for the
distinction is much less available in the syntax for English-speaking children.
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Kotfila & de Villiers (2019) compared 4-6 year olds’ performance on wh-questions with
complements with the two modal flavors, and compared the responses to how children respond when
there is no modal involved:
32. Why did Dad tell Grandma Mom must make soup? (deontic)
33. Why did Dad tell Grandma Mom must be making soup? (epistemic)
34. Why did Dad tell Grandma Mom was making soup? (tensed)
Interestingly, the children (aged 4 to 6) successfully resisted “reality” (i.e. only lower clause) answers
more for all modals, regardless of semantic type, compared to tensed clauses. However, it remains
possible that the children treated the epistemic modals as if they were deontics, as there was no
independent evidence that they knew the distinction at this age (see also Cournane, 2015). We need to
discover if the syntax of modals is established together with their semantics, so there is much still to be
learned.
In addition, much discussion about the semantics of epistemic modals as in
35. Bella must be washing the dog.
has been devoted to the question of whose knowledge state is being expressed: the speaker’s, or a shared
Point of View? Stephenson (2007) points out that one can refer to the set of worlds "compatible with
what is known," but the question is, known by who? If "what is known" is taken to mean "what is
known by the speaker," the resulting meaning is too weak. On the other hand, if "what is known" is
taken to mean "what is known by anyone at all" or "what is known by people in general" the meaning
becomes too strong. It turns out to be difficult to establish whose knowledge is relevant for the
interpretation of epistemic modals. Yet Stephenson shows that there is a class of examples where this
uncertainty is less, namely those such as (44)-(45) where an epistemic modal is embedded under think.
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36. Sam thinks it might be raining.
37. Sam thinks it must be raining.
The knowledge state involved is decided: it is Sam’s.
Epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste (tasty, fun, yucky) have parallel behavior in
attitude reports. The meaning of a sentence like:
38. Licorice is tasty.
according to Pearson (2013), is that licorice is tasty to the speaker and any relevant individual in the
context with whom the speaker identifies. Lasersohn (2005) discusses a similar puzzle that arises with
these "predicates of personal taste" like (46) to raise the puzzle, parallel to that of epistemic modals, that
if tasty in sentences like (2) is taken to mean "tasty for the speaker" or "tasty for someone," the meaning
is too weak, but if it is taken to mean "tasty for everyone" or "tasty for people in general" it becomes too
strong.  Yet the uncertainty is less under a mental state verb:
39) The girl thinks licorice is tasty.
Stephenson (2007) makes clear that the puzzles of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste are
related, and there is still much to be done on these issues in acquisition. The questions revolve around
the Point of View (knowledge, or taste) of the experiencer, and how that gets fixed in the case of matrix
verbs versus complements. This is parallel to the puzzle above about truth.  Aravind and de Villiers
(unpublished) made an initial attempt to explore predicates of personal taste, using a strategy much like
that of Lewis et al (2013), namely, we introduced two characters with different opinions (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 here
Semanticists have called these kind of circumstances “faultless disagreements”, because how do we
know how to judge the truth of the matter if Jim thinks something is fun, and Jane thinks it's boring?  We
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thought children might do better on such questions than on regular complements, given there is no truth
of the matter. In fact, with our 14 children aged 3 to 6 years, they did find these judgements remarkably
easy, with even the 3 year olds (N=4) getting 77% correct (See Figure 5).
Figure 5 here
We also tried questions like this:
40. Did the raccoon think the yucky fishbones were yummy?
Unlike matrix clauses, complements allow these weird inversions in which Point of View switches can
occur, and the children were not thrown off by such questions: they did equivalently well on cases where
we used the two contrasting adjectives in the same sentence.
We also asked them matrix questions like:
41. Are the fishbones yummy?
Adults balk on such a question, saying, “well, it depends!” This can be taken as a further demonstration
of the general claim: there is no constraint on the PoV of the adjective in a simple sentence, and context
must be used. We thought the children would take a standard point of view on these, or at least the point
of view expressed by the character most like them (say, the child instead of the parent, the child instead
of the raccoon), but they did not, at least at 3 and 4, answering randomly.  At 5, they were more likely to
adopt their own view.  But in the complement case, the PoV was constrained, even for young children.
Studies of the acquisition of a range of phenomena inside complements is very incomplete to
date, even in English, not to mention accommodating them within the range of possible grammars in the
world’s languages. The new interest in pragmatics, in questions-under-discussion, in focus and force,
must also be addressed and connected. But linguistic researchers are already imagining ways to
assimilate these considerations into tree structures instead of treating them as competing alternatives to
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syntax (Rizzi & Cinque, 2016; Woods, 2016). Regardless of the linguistic solution, it becomes evident
that the kind of thinking involved here is linguistic. There is nothing, it seems, that could be a nonverbal
counterpart. Human language supplies the concepts itself.
9.0 Conclusion
The paper began by raising the possibility that human language has concepts that are embedded
in the language itself. This was set in opposition to the pervasive idea that fully-developed concepts
always exist first in a non-verbal realm and are then labeled by language. Imagine three levels at which
this might be true.
At the first level are the concepts for things, actions, and properties. There is certainly abundant
evidence that other nonverbal creatures, animals and infants, can react to these stimulus classes, to
discriminate and classify. Nevertheless, words themselves, lexical classes, go beyond names for classes
of stimuli. What they correspond to is something more like the philosophical object of a sortal: a way to
tell when object begins and another ends, a procedure for counting, a procedure for telling when a
change is fatal to class membership or not (a pulverized chair versus a pulverized potato) (Xu, 2007).
Perhaps language provides us with sortals.
At the second level, there are combinatorial concepts, ranging from relations in space (To the left
of the red wall) to the intricacies of deictic indices (Tell her what color your eyes are). What if no
nonverbal equivalent exists? The language can be analyzed as containing these intricate relationships,
but it doesn’t just scaffold them: they are brought into being by language. Consider the class of events
that can be described as “mother kiss child” rather than “child kiss mother”. Bear in mind also the
sortals of child and mother and kiss, not just poor perceptual substitutes for them like large two-legged
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and small two-legged, or “put face on other face” (see e.g. Vonk’s (2002) work on primates). But even
beyond the sortals, the grammar allows the appropriate structuring of the events as a class into ones with
the same type of agent and affected patient, not just any unordered trio of child, mother, kiss. The
question is: Can the event classes exist, cognitively, without language?
Finally, there is the case of embedded propositions, and opacity of truth. The language faculty
appears to play a role in offering the representational structure for such possible worlds in other people’s
minds, perhaps especially with regard to the intentional contents of a belief. Not only are different
structures used for different propositional attitudes, but even phenomena that seem purely semantic, like
the difference between deontic and epistemic modals (Hacquard, 2006), or the different interpretations
of an evidential (Bhadra, 2018) could be represented in the syntax.  Here, point of view is maximally
complex, and the idea of a counterpart in nonverbal cognition starts to dissolve. We use language to
imagine contexts in which contrasts of knowledge, inference and perception would occur. These
contexts become impossibly far removed from two different visual perspectives on a scene.
I lay out these radical possibilities because there is a host of empirical studies needed to advance
the debate. There are many perplexing results based on the assumption that the linguistic form must
require its constitutive concept(s) be visible in a nonverbal realm first. My work has led me to question
that assumption.
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Table 1: Understanding of Theory of Mind of Others
9m to 2.5 years       Shared attention, eye gaze, intent/goal of others.
2.5-3.5 years           Desires, pretence, “scripted” or conventional emotions
3.5-4.5 years           Seeing leads to knowing, emotions based on desires
4.5 -6 years             False beliefs: contents, prediction, explanation, emotions based on them
6 years and up         Second order false beliefs, opacity, spatial perspective taking
Table 2: Measures for SEM
False Belief Understanding
Verbal False Belief Tasks
2 Unexpected Contents containers
(asked about own and others’ false beliefs)
2 Unseen Location Change stories
(where will the character first look for the object)
Low-verbal False Belief Tasks
(6 different false belief scenarios, with 3 true belief)
Picture Sequence Version
Thought bubble false belief tasks
Language Measures
Expressive one-word vocabulary (EOWPVT-R)
DELV screener
Memory for False Complements
Conflict Inhibition (EF) Measures
Inhibitory Control
Bear and Dragon Task (“Simon says”)
Knock-Tap Test
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Figure 2: Preschool children tested on QUILS: Comprehension of finite versus nonfinite
complement types.
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Figure 5  Performance on predicates of personal taste in complements
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